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Races often collide in segmented markets where buyers
belong to one ethnic group while sellers belong to another. This
Article examines one such market: the retail of wigs and hair
extensions for African Americans, a multi-billion-dollar market
controlled by Korean Americans. Although previous scholarship
attributed the success of Korean American ventures to rotating
credit and social capital, this Article ascribes their dominance in
wigs and extensions to collusion and exclusion, tactics scrutinized
under antitrust.
This Article is the first to synthesize the disparate treatment
of ethnically segmented markets in law, sociology, and economics
into a comprehensive framework. Its primary contribution is to
forge the concept of ethnically segmented and misaligned
(“ESM”) markets, where buyers and sellers are ethnically distinct
from one another.
ESM markets challenge entrenched paradigms in antitrust. In
the wigs and extensions market, the endurance of Korean
American retailers confounds conventional notions of market
power, which is measured at the firm level. This market suggests
that numerous in-group incumbents can compete intensely with
one another but collaborate to stymie out-group insurgents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Segmented markets are the product of markets dividing to
serve groups with similar supply or demand preferences. 1 In
ethnically segmented markets, that division occurs due to ethnic
or racial preferences. For instance, an all-white homeowners’
association might exclude African Americans from a
neighborhood to inflate home values, thereby segmenting its
housing stock. 2 More innocuously, grocery stores in a diverse city
might track the segmented food preferences of its ethnic
residents. 3
The
most
puzzling—and
disconcerting—ethnically
segmented markets, however, are ones where consumers hail
from one ethnic or racial group while sellers hail from another.
Such markets present a conundrum: why are buyers and sellers
ethnically distinct?
The piecemeal literature on ethnically segmented markets
does not provide a satisfactory answer. In economics, the debate
MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING
INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 196-200 (1980).
2 See Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 45 (2010). Similarly,
labor markets might be segment along the lines of occupation, geography, race,
education, and immigration status. See Michael Reich et al., Dual Labor Markets:
A Theory of Labor Market Segmentation, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 359 (1973); William T.
Dickens & Kevin Lang, Labor Market Segmentation Theory: Reconsidering the
Evidence, in LABOR ECONOMICS: PROBLEMS IN ANALYZING LABOR MARKETS
(William Darity, Jr. ed., 1993).
3 See Ogenyi E. Omar et al., Food Shopping Behavior Among Ethnic and Non-Ethnic
Communities in Britain, 10 J. FOOD PRODUCTS MARKETING 39 (2004). Some
markets, such as ethnic foods, are more susceptible to consumer crossover than
others, such as ethnic beauty products. With ethnic foods, debates of purity
versus fusion replicate the economic discourse on market segmentation and
integration while upping the cultural ante. See, e.g., Roxana Hadadi, Alison
Roman, the Colonization of Spices, and the Exhausting Prevalence of Ethnic Erasure
in
Popular
Food
Culture,
PAJIBA,
May
9,
2020,
https://www.pajiba.com/celebrities_are_better_than_you/alison-romanand-the-exhausting-prevalence-of-ethnic-erasure-in-popular-foodculture.php.
1
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has revolved around whether racial preferences are inefficient
and, by extension, whether ethnically segmented markets should
yield to market integration over time. 4 Neither side convincingly
explains why some ethnically segmented markets thrive as a
misalignment of ethnically distinct buyers and sellers. 5 After all,
ethnically homogenous consumers should prefer to buy from coethnic producers. 6
Legal scholars tend to examine ethnically segmented markets
from the side of producers rather than consumers. Borrowing
from antitrust theory, race and law scholars have framed the
exclusion of peoples of color from housing and labor markets as a
mechanism of racial cartels. 7 In law and development circles, one
camp of scholars has emphasized structural explanations for the
dominance of ethnic groups in niche markets, typically against the
backdrop of exclusion of all peoples of color from mainstream
economies. 8 By contrast, another other camp has fixated on the
institutions, relationships, and private ordering peculiar to ethnic
communities. 9 In totality, however, legal scholars have not
See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
See Amanda Lea Robinson, Internal Borders: Ethnic-Based Market Segmentation
in Malawi, 87 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 371 (2016).
6 In fact, silos of co-ethnic buyers and sellers mark societies that are
characterized by high degrees of interethnic tension and economic
fragmentation. See id.
7 See Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 51 (defining racial cartels as “groups in which
members agree to artificially fix wages, property values, political power and
other price-like analogues, by restricting supply, dividing up markets, or
colluding to achieve other commercial conditions).
8 See, e.g., Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, The Blacks Who “Got Their Forty Acres
and a Mule”: A Theory of Black Weest Indian Migrant Asset Acquisition, 89 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 27 (2014) (examining structural factors giving entrepreneurs from the
West Indies a leg up, in comparison with other Black Americans).
9 See, e.g., Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
841 (1999) (examining rotating credit associations in immigrant communities)
[hereinafter Cao, Communities and Markets]; Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy,
and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1
(1998) (correlating the success of some “market-dominant minorities” with
4
5
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articulated a comprehensive theory of markets that are both
ethnically segmented and ethnically misaligned.
Sociology presents the most exhaustive treatment of these
markets, though it, too, falls short in explaining the persistence of
ethnic misalignment. Here the seminal work revolved around
middleman minorities—sojourners such as Chinese, Jewish,
Indian, and Lebanese merchants who mediate between majority
and other minority groups. 10 Over time, this framework morphed
into
ethnic entrepreneurs to cover non-itinerant groups.11
Nonetheless, it continued to miss the business tactics that enable
in-group sellers to maintain dominance over out-group
competitors. 12
To unify the disparate approaches across law, economics, and
sociology, this Article articulates a theory for the endurance of
ethnically segmented markets where producers hail from one
ethnicity while consumers hail from another—a concept this
Article calls ethnically segmented and misaligned (“ESM”)
their cultural dispositions); BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE: THE
DIAMOND NETWORK AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE (2017)
[hereinafter RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE] (linking the success of certain
ethnicities in the diamond industry with intraethnic exchanges and
relationships); Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship:
Comparative Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1599 (2000) (tracing the development of Chinese corporate law to traditions of
family and kinship).
10 See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS
(1967); Edna Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM. SOC. REV. 583
(1973). See also FELIX CHANG & SUNNIE RUCKER-CHANG (EDS.), CHINESE
MIGRANTS IN RUSSIA, CENTRAL ASIA AND EUROPE (2010); KHUN-ENG KUAH &
EVELYN HU DEHART (EDS.), VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CHINESE
DIASPORA (2006).
11 See IVAN LIGHT & EDNA BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: KOREANS IN
LOS ANGELES 1965–1982, 17 (1988) [hereinafter LIGHT & BONACICH, IMMIGRANT
ENTREPRENEURS]; See also Zulema Valdez, Beyond Ethnic Entrepreneurship: An
Embedded Market Approach to Group Affiliation in American Enterprise, 15 RACE,
GENDER & CLASS 156 (2008).
12 But see In-JIN YOON, ON MY OWN: KOREAN BUSINESSES AND RACE RELATIONS
IN AMERICA (1997); In-Jin Yoon, The Growth of Korean Immigrant Entrepreneurship
in Chicago, 18 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 315 (1995).
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markets. As its first step, the Article proffers a definition of
ethnically segmented markets that encompasses all three
disciplines. The Article’s central contribution is to bring clarity to
this concept, which has spanned multiple fields with no coherent
framework.
Focusing on the retail of wigs and hair extensions to African
Americans, which is dominated by Korean American firms, this
Article illuminates that most peculiar of segmented markets—
where buyers and sellers are ethnically homogenous but
misaligned. The size of the market for hair and extensions is
estimated at $6 billion. 13 It is delineated along racial lines, with
African American women comprising the largest segment. Due to
a confluence of societal pressures and beauty standards, African
American women are also steadfast consumers, 14 so demand in
the market is inelastic, which tends to support market power
among producers. 15
This Article argues that Korean American sellers (the
market’s main producers) maintain dominance not through
structural or cultural advantages, but by collusion and exclusion.
In mainstream economies, these strategies are employed by so
many dominant firms that they have become the staple of
antitrust cases. 16 In ESM markets, however, coordination and
exclusion assume a sociological dimension, with anticompetitive

Susan Adams, Long on Hair: The World’s First Venture-Backed Human-HairExtension Company Wants To Be The Airbnb of Salons, FORBES, Sept. 27, 2019.
14 See infra Section III.A.
15 See infra Section IV.A.1.
16 See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. U.S., 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (parallel insertion
of price maintenance clause into exhibition contracts by film distributors led to
inference of collusion); American Column & Lumber Co. v. U.S., 257 U.S. 377
(1921) (information exchange among hardwood manufacturers facilitated by
trade association found to constitute price fixing); U.S. v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323
(4th Cir. 1979) (communication among otherwise competing realtors facilitated
their conspiracy to raise commission rates).
13
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effects reinforced by co-ethnic bonds. 17 During the 1970s, it was a
combination of economic forces, racial structures, and shifting
beauty standards that initially propelled Korean-owned firms to
power. 18 This Article focuses on how Korean American retailers
leveraged and maintained that power in the face of challenges by
African American competitors. In these markets, retailers
managed to band together intraethnically and fend off
competition interracially, through tactics that can be
conceptualized as antitrust offenses.
Antitrust is an apt springboard for analysis because African
Americans often frame their relationship with Korean American
retailers in anticompetitive terms. It is often asserted that Korean
American firms exert a “monopoly” over, and have
“monopolized,” the Black beauty supply stores. 19 Yet monopoly
and monopolization have specific meanings that demand careful
market power analysis. 20 Working through the requisite steps
infuses the literature on these buyer–seller interactions (and,
accordingly, interethnic interactions) with rigor. Further, the
interactions between African American buyers and Korean
American sellers occur wholly outside the ambit of the state and
therefore out of the purview of public law. That race relations

This is not entirely straightforward. While Korean Americans can appeal to
ethnic solidarity and utilize publications and associates to facilitate information
exchange, intraethnic competition is intense. See LIGHT & BONACICH,
IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 11, at 193–93.
18 See Jason Petrulis, “A Country of Hair”: A Global Story of South Korean Wigs,
Korean American Entrepreneurs, African American Hairstyles, and Cold War
Industrialization, 21 ENTERPRISE & SOC. 1 (2020); Ku-Sup Chin et al., Immigrant
Small Business and International Economic Linkage: A Case of the Korean Wig
Business in Los Angeles, 1968-1977, 30 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 485 (1996). This
history has entered popular imagination as well. See NICOLA YOON, THE SUN IS
ALSO A STAR (2016).
19 See Edward Tony Lloneau, How and Why Korean Owned Beauty Supply Stores
Dominate in the Afro Community, LIQUID GOLD BLOG (2013) [archived at
https://perma.cc/9D5U-BPNF].
20 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 92 (4th ed. 2011).
17
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often unfold as private transactions under private law is wellunderstood. 21 Arguably, where transactions between races can be
characterized as buyer–seller transactions, as in ESM markets,
laws governing commerce are more appropriate than
antidiscrimination laws as a point of entry.
Insights about ethnically segmented markets can push the
boundaries of antitrust as well. The endurance of Korean
American firms suggests that collusive and exclusionary schemes
may be more stable than antitrust theory holds. Further, this
market suggests that measuring market power at the firm level
may not always be appropriate. While the literature on cartels has
centered on a small number of large producers, 22 coordination
among a multitude of small firms in ESM markets is possible. 23
This coheres with the axiom from sociology that an ethnic group
withdraws into itself, strengthening co-ethnic bonds, when
threatened by exogenous forces. 24 This Article’s second major
contribution is therefore the discovery that in-group producers
can coordinate against and exclude out-group competitors by
utilizing ethnic bonds.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: Section II
synthesizes the treatment of ethnically segmented markets in law,
Debate over the scope of public law to cover private actions stretches as far
back as the Reconstruction Amendments. See HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, WEST
FROM APPOMATTOX: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA AFTER THE CIVIL WAR
204–05 (2007); George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2008) More recent discourse on the
relevance of private law to interethnic relations includes Cao, Communities and
Markets, supra note 9; RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE, supra note 9.
22 The classic study is Reinhard Selten, A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition,
Where 4 Are Few and 6 Are Many, 2 INT’L J. GAME TH. 141 (1973). See also Margaret
C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON.
LIT. 43 (2006); Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contrcts?, 39 J.L. & ECON.
241 (1996).
23 National Society of Professional Engineers; BMI
24 Beleagurered merchants likely to withdraw into “distinctive cultural and
organizational forms,” thereby resisting integration. J.H. Turner & Edna
Bonacich, Toward a Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities, 7 ETHNICITY 144,
154 (1980).
21
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economics, and sociology to provide an edifice for the concept.
Section III introduces the market for wigs and hair extensions as
a template for ESM markets. Section IV works through the market
power and facilitating practices of Korean American retailers. In
doing so, it considers how this market pushes the boundaries of
antitrust doctrine.
Before this Article proceeds further, an explanation of
terminology is in order. First, this Article refers to “ethnically”
segmented markets rather than “racially” segmented markets
even though the latter could suffice for the retail of wigs and hair
extensions to African Americans. African Americans, of course,
are a racialized group, 25 while Korean Americans are an ethnicity
within the Asian American racial group. 26 Their misalignment in
this market is both ethnic and racial. Nevertheless, the Article
adopts “ethnic” for consistency with the sociological literature,
which refers to ethnic entrepreneurs.27 This also attains a greater
degree of precision regarding the producers (i.e., Korean
Americans), rather than subsuming them in a larger racial
category (i.e., Asian Americans, whose diverse constituents
exhibit differing rates of entrepreneurship). This specificity is
consistent with the antitrust notion that markets must be defined
as narrowly as possible to accurately capture market power. 28

MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(3rd ed., 2014). Recent scholarship, however, has come to view race as a power
construct, rather than social construct. See, e.g., [prior work redacted for
anonymity].
26 For a thorough literature review of ethnicity, especially in the context of
Asian Americans, see YEN LE ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PANETHNICITY:
BRIDGING INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITIES 1–10 (1992).
27 See infra Section II.B.
28 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 92 (“A relevant market is the smallest
grouping of sales for which the elasticity of demand and supply are sufficiently
low that a ‘hypothetical monopolist’ . . . could profitably reduce output and
increase price . . .”).
25
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II. DEFINING ETHNICALLY SEGMENTED MARKETS
Existing treatment of ethnically segmented markets is, for
lack of a better word, segmented along disciplines. Law,
economics, and sociology have all tackled ethnically segmented
markets, but through their narrow disciplinary confines. This
Section assembles a definition of ethnically segmented markets
from the disparate but complementary scholarship, with a view
toward illuminating the markets at the crux of this Article.
Ultimately, this Section arrives at the following definition of
ethnically segmented and misaligned markets: buyers are
ethnically homogenous and exhibit similar demand preferences
but are served by producers who are themselves ethnically
homogenous but also ethnically distinct from buyers.
A. Contributions from Law
1. Market division
Law’s primary contribution to ethnically segmented markets
is the insight from antitrust that markets divide. They divide
naturally, as a result of consumer preferences, and artificially, as
a result of coordination to boost and maintain market power.
These divisions form the basis for market segmentation along the
demarcations of ethnicity. Other legal concepts, such as racial
cartels and the interplay between markets and ethnicity, build
upon this intuition of segmentation.
Every market can be broken down into a product market and
a geographic market. 29 A product market might segment along
price points, while a geographic market might splinter to reflect
logistical challenges. For instance, the vast market for hotels is
indisputably segmented along high-end and budget options, with
a large and amorphous segment in the middle. In New York City,
the Ritz Carlton or Waldorf Astoria might be interchangeable
29

Id. at §§ 3.3, 3.6.
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with each other but not with budget motels. 30 New York City may
not even comprise one geographic market. Arguably, high-end
hotels in Staten Island are not interchangeable with high-end
hotels in Midtown Manhattan. 31
With ethnically segmented markets, product markets are
divided along ethnic lines. In a metropolis as large and diverse as
Los Angeles, it would be foolhardy to define the grocery store
market as all grocery stores in Los Angeles County. The product
market is segmented along ethnic lines, catering to the tastes and
preferences of the city’s multitude of residents. 32 This holds for
even smaller slivers of the County. Thus, all grocery stores in the
Mid-Wilshire area of Los Angeles cannot be lumped into one
product market; given the area’s diversity, grocery stores catering
mostly to Chicano patrons might not be interchangeable with
stores catering mostly to Ethiopian or Korean patrons. Further,
considering the snarl of Los Angeles traffic, geographic markets
should be drawn more compactly than in other cities. Thus, even
if Asian grocery stores comprise a single product market, we
might aptly define Asian grocery stores in Monterey Park and
West Covina as separate geographic markets, even though both
are located in the San Gabriel Valley. 33 The 10 miles that separate

The two extremes are not interchangeable, meaning customers at either end
are unlikely to cross over into the other segment. This is the hallmark of
delineating a market, with boundaries drawn only around products that are
not interchangeable or substitutable.
31 Business and luxury travelers to Midtown Manhattan may be inclined to stay
close to the center of financial activity or tourist attractions.
32 As an illustration of the aptness of the “ethnic” segmentation label, saying
that grocery stores in Los Angeles are segmented along racial lines might even
be too imprecise. The many ethnicities racialized as Hispanic, for instance, may
diverge in culinary preferences. See Vanessa Fonseca, Nuevo Latino: Rebranding
Latin American Cuisine, 8 CONSUMPTION, MARKETS AND CULTURE 95, 100–01
(2005).
33 On the demographic fluctuations of Monterey Park, see Keith Aoki, Direct
Democracy, Racial Group Agency, Local Government law, and Residential Racial
Segregation: Some Reflections on Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV.
185 (1997).
30
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these two neighborhoods might be prohibitively far for a
customer to drive to save, say, 10%, on the cost of groceries. 34
2. Racial cartelization and exclusion
Notably,
market
segmentation—including
ethnic
segmentation—can arise from more heavy-handed forces than
product preferences or ease of transportation. Producers, rather
than consumers, might divide markets to maintain market
power—i.e., their ability to increase profits by reducing output
and charging supracompetitive prices. 35 Famously, a bar review
course provider ceded the Georgia market to another provider in
exchange for a covenant not to compete outside the state; thus,
each monopolized a portion of the national market.36 In
heterogenous product markets, firms might specialize in specific
products so as to minimize overlap and attain market power.37
This nefarious strain of market segmentation informs what
race and law scholars have coined as “racial cartels.” 38 Just as
several producers with small market shares can band together to
divide a market among themselves, all-white associations can
cartelize a market to raise economic, social, and racial status.39
Coordination foments power. More concretely, white unions
went on strike to prevent employers from hiring Black and
Chinese workers, thereby restricting the pool of available labor
and boosting earning within that pool. 40 White homeowners’
associations persuaded homeowners to adopt racially restrictive
For a discussion of the 10% figure, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 95–96.
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).See
also Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in
Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987).
36 Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
37 Kenneth M. Davidson, The Competitive Significance of Segmented Markets, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 445 (1983).
38 See Roithmayr, supra note 2.
39 See DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK
IN WHITE ADVANTAGE (2014).
40 [hafez]
34
35
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covenants that prevented home sales to African Americans, Asian
Americans, and Latinos, thereby ensuring White ownership of
homes and boosting home values. 41 The Democratic Party purged
Black members between the 1880s and the 1950s to lock-up
political power. 42 In each instance, Whites segmented the
markets—for labor, for homes, and for political representation—
along racial lines and inflated pricing and power through
strategies of cartelization and exclusion.
From racial cartels, we discover that even small and discrete
numbers can band together to concoct and execute exclusionary
schemes. As we shall see, this pushes against the antitrust notion
that cartels fare best when members are few and large and
markets are concentrated. 43 We can also begin to understand how
some markets remain ethnically misaligned: through the hard
work of cultivating oligopolies and exclusion.
3. Interplay between ethnicities and markets
Legal scholars have posited alternating theories for why
certain markets are dominated by ethnically homogenous
producers. One fixture among law and development scholars is
Amy Chua, whose inquiries into “market-dominant ethnic
minorities” began in the 1990s, soon after the Los Angeles riots
and the fall of the Soviet Union. 44 Professor Chua noted the
similarities binding these minorities worldwide, who tend to
See Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Segregation in Post-Civil Rights
America: Stalled Integration or End of the Segregated Century?, 11 DU BOIS REV.:
SOC. SCI. RES. ON RACE 205 (2014); HARRIET B. NEUBURGER ET AL. NEIGHBORHOOD
AND LIFE CHANCES: HOW PLACE MATTERS IN MODERN AMERICA (2011);
Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 52–53. See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
42 Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 65–70.
43 See Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW &
ECON. 365 (1970); George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of PriceFixing Conspiracies, 17 J. LAW & ECON. 13 (1974); HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at
159.
44 See Chua, supra note 9; AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE
MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2004).
41
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transact
with
“impoverished”
and
“disadvantaged”
45
“indigenous” majorities. She conjectured that economic and
political liberalization fueled interethnic conflicts by
strengthening the hand of the market-dominant minorities.46
While some of Professor Chua’s subsequent writings provoked
controversy, 47 her work in this area remains influential.
Other scholars have examined the traits and communal
practices within certain ethnic groups that fuel high rates of
entrepreneurship. Here studies of the kye, or rotating credit
systems in the Korean community, are emblematic. 48 In rotating
credit systems, members contribute money on a regular basis into
a communal pot and take turns withdrawing from the pot. 49 For
law scholars, rotating credit signifies a broader pattern of informal
arrangements held together by trust, ethnic solidarity, and
decentralized information exchange—features endogenous to,
and built up within, ethnic communities. 50 To be sure, these
CHUA, supra note 41, at 6 and 7. Professor Chua’s work has limited
applicability to ethnically segmented and misaligned markets. In the U.S.,
buyers and sellers in these markets tend to be minority groups themselves; the
dynamics are different and altogether fluid.
46 Id. at 7. On the use of competition law as a corrective to the influence of
market-dominant minorities, see Eleanor M. Fox, Equality, Discrimination, and
Competition Law: Lessons From and For South Africa and Indonesia, 41 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 579 (2000).
47 Professor Chua subsequent books include AMY CHUA & JED RUBENFELD, THE
TRIPLE PACKAGE: HOW THREE UNLIKELY TRAITS EXPLAIN THE RISE AND FALL OF
CULTURAL GROUPS IN AMERICA (2014), which would be criticized for suggesting
that some minority groups are innately dominant and interethnic tension is
inherent. See, e.g., Jennifer Lee & Min Zhou, From Unassimilable to Exceptional:
The Rise of Asian Americans and “Stereotype Promise”, 16 NEW DIVERSITIES 7
(2014).
48 Other examples include the Chinese and Vietnamese “hui,” the Japanese
“tanamoshi,” the Cambodian “thong thing,” the Mexican “cundina,” the
Ethiopian “ekub,” and West Indian “esusu.” Cao, Communities and Markets,
supra note 9, at 848.
49 These informal arrangements are often the primary source of funding for
starting businesses.
50 See id. See also Lan Cao, The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1521 (2003).
45
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scholars are cognizant of structural factors. Lan Cao, for instance,
devotes plenty of discussion to why certain groups (e.g., Koreans,
Chinese, and Mexicans) can amass capital while other cannot
(e.g., African Americans). 51 Hence, this literature might be
characterized bottom-up studies of the endogenous and
sociocultural factors that contribute to ethnic entrepreneurship. 52
In a similar vein, Barak Richman has written on the control
over the diamond industry exerted by ethnic groups who rely on
private systems of contract enforcement. 53 Jewish merchants in
New York, for instance, owe their success to intraethnic
institutions that enforce executory contracts and enable payment
for diamonds on credit. 54 Like the kye, these institutions function
outside the auspices of any government, so Professor Richman
calls them “stateless commerce.” 55
Ethnic trading networks are also stateless in the sense that they
cross national boundaries. The diamond trade is a transnational
business controlled at certain junctures by specific ethnic groups,
particularly Jewish merchants—just as wigs and hair extensions
for African Americans are manufactured, distributed, and sold in
a transnational chain where Koreans and Korean Americans
predominate. Where the wigs and hair extensions market departs
from the case studies of Professors Cao and Richman, however, is
in its ethnic misalignment between producers and consumers. For
the diamond markets to resemble this ESM market, customers
would have to be ethnically homogenous peoples of color who are
ethnically distinct from the merchants. Moreover, diamonds

See Cao, supra note 9, at 879.
Id. at 863.
53 See Barak D. Richman, Contracts and Cartels: Reconciling Competition and
Development Policy, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (D. Daniel Sokol
et al. eds., 2013); Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic
Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383
(2006) [hereinafter Richman, Community Institutions]; RICHMAN, STATELESS
COMMERCE supra note 9.
54 Richman, Community Institutions, supra note 50, at 389.
55 RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE supra note 9, at xi.
51
52
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would have to be indispensable to conformity with mainstream
aesthetic standards, 56 and co-ethnic sellers would have to be
virtually nonexistent. 57 Thus, while the bottom-up endogenous
scholarship directs our attention to the institutional factors of
Korean success (and those institutions certainly exist), ethnic
misalignment of the wigs and hair extensions market requires that
we consider two groups: purchasers and consumers.
At the other end of law and development scholarship are
academics who look exclusively at structural explanations for the
success of specific ethnic groups. 58 Eleanor Brown, for example,
positions her work on property rights as a complement to cultural
approaches toward West Indians immigrants and their
descendants, who exhibit much higher rates of entrepreneurship
than other racialized Black Americans. 59 Professor Brown relates
the success of Black West Indians to their early exposure to
property and contract rights as landholders on the islands. 60 Land
sales financed the emigration of West Indians, who upon arrival
in the U.S. took advantage of their experiences to acquire land and
build wealth—at substantially greater proportions than “native”
African Americans. 61 Interestingly, Caribbean families often
became landlords to local African Americans. 62
The relationship between Korean Americans and African
Americans in the wigs and hair extensions market is even more
visibly different because it is interracial. Of course, no discussion
of Korean American–African American relations is complete
See infra notes 176–79 and accompanying discussion.
See infra note 198 and accompanying discussion.
58 Some scholars would place structural and cultural views in the same
category, one emphasizing that certain institutions and cultural features
determine behavior. At the other end is the agency or functionalist view, which
emphasizes that individuals create institutions to serve their interests and
needs. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN
ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 12–13 (2006).
59 See Brown, supra note 8.
60 Id. at 41–42.
61 Id. at 49.
62 Id. at 52 n.90.
56
57
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without mentioning that for all the relative difference in their
stations, both are peoples of color excluded from participation in
the mainstream economy. Therefore, their interactions have often
been pushed to niches in urban landscapes where frictions are
bound to arise. 63 Smoldering for decades, these frictions exploded
into riots in Los Angeles in 1992, when Korean American
businesses were vandalized after the acquittal of the White police
officers who beat Rodney King and the Korean American
storeowner who shot Latasha Harlins. 64 Law scholars with a
structuralist bent were quick to underscore the similarities in
systemic exclusion of both Asian Americans and African
Americans, frequently with the blessing if not at the direction of
the state.65 Asian American legal scholars, who were gaining
prominence in the academy, called for the emergence of critical
Asian American scholarship in the tradition of critical race
theory. 66 For all the shared legacy of discrimination and exclusion,
however, when Korean American and African American
interactions assume market dimensions, such as buyer–seller
transactions, tensions can be exacerbated. 67
See Kwang Chung Kim & Shin Kim, The Multiracial Nature of Los Angeles
Unrest in 1992, in KOREANS IN THE HOOD: CONFLICT WITH AFRICAN AMERICANS
17 (Kwang Chung Kim ed., 1999); Yoon, supra note 12, at 328.
64 Kyeyoung Park, Use and Abuse of Race and Culture: Black-Korean Tension in
America, in KOREANS IN THE HOOD: CONFLICT WITH AFRICAN AMERICANS 60
(Kwang Chung Kim ed., 1999); Melvin L. Oliver et al., Anatomy of a Rebellion: A
Political-Economic Analysis, in READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN
UPRISING 117 (Robert Gooding-Williams, ed., 1993). See also Genaro Molina,
How the Killing of Latasha Harlins Changed South L.A., L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2016.
65 See, e.g., Sumi K. Cho, Korean Americans vs. African Americans: Conflict and
Construction, in READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN UPRISING 196 (Robert
Gooding-Williams, ed., 1993); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in
the Story of African American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed “Los
Angeles”, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1993); Reginald Leamon Robinson, “The Other
Against Itself”: Deconstructing the Violent Discourse between Korean and African
Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15 (1993).
66 See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical
Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241 (1993).
67 Kim & Kim, supra note 60.
63
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From the structuralists, this Article extrapolates the lesson
that ethnically misaligned buyers and sellers are pushed into close
quarters by racial and macroeconomic forces. Departing from this
starting point, however, the Article also scrutinizes the efforts of
Korean American sellers to maintain the dominance that systemic
forces conveyed them. To explain the persistence of ethnic
misalignment, especially in the face of challenges to sellers by outgroup upstarts, the Article turns toward endogenous or bottomup perspectives to examine mechanisms adopted by in-group
sellers. While this approach might be out of fashion in legal
circles, given the popularity of systemic analyses, it is consistent
with more recent sociological work, which has emphasized the
agency of ethnic entrepreneurs. 68
B. Contributions from Sociology
Sociology laid the foundation for ethnicity and
entrepreneurship, providing basic definitions and theoretical
frameworks. 69 To this day, much of the innovative scholarship on
ethnic markets resides in sociology. In 1967, Hubert Blalock
devised the term middleman minority to describe minority
entrepreneurs who mediate between dominant and subordinate
groups. 70 This concept became indelibly associated with Edna
Bonacich, who posited that middlemen minorities succeed
because they are sojourners or economic migrants intent on
saving aggressively. 71 Together with Ivan Light, Professor
Bonacich conducted a series of ethnographic studies on Korean
See infra Section II.B.
basic definitions of, and the link between, ethnicity and entrepreneurship,
for example, see Howard E. Aldrich & Roger Waldinger, Ethnicity and
Entrepreneurship, 16 ANNU. REV. SOCIOL. 111, 112 (1990) (defining “ethnic
group” as membership in a group with a common origin and culture that is
reinforced by social structures and “entrepreneurship” as combining resources
in novel ways to create something of value).
70 HUBERT M. BLALOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS 79
(1967).
71 See Bonacich, supra note 10.
68

69 On
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Americans, finding that this community exhibits high rates of
entrepreneurship relative to other ethnic groups. 72 Korean
American firms compete by employing family members at low
wages, thereby utilizing social networks to amass capital and
control expenses. 73 Their businesses also gravitate toward certain
sectors (e.g., retail) and neighborhoods (e.g., impoverished or
lower middle class). 74
The middleman minority framework broadened into an
ethnic or immigrant entrepreneur framework to encompass nonsojourning communities. 75 Subsequent studies on Korean
American entrepreneurs added to Light and Bonacich’s
observations, confirming that low-margin retail businesses in
low-income neighborhoods function as the entry-point for most
Korean Americans, who, after having saved enough, trade up for
ventures in more prestigious industries and higher-income
neighborhoods. 76 These scholars also compiled a more
sophisticated portrait of Korean American small businesses that
relate their success back to two additional factors: (i) bilateral
trade between the U.S. and Korea, which facilitated the import of
manufactured goods from Korea and enabled Korean Americans
to construct retail infrastructures for those goods; and (ii) a high
degree of vertical integration of retail and import, which achieved
efficiencies—but also fostered exclusion of out-group
competitors. 77
See LIGHT & BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 11.
Id. at 185–86; Yoon, supra note 12, at 328–29.
74 LIGHT & BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 11, at 179–84,
205–26.
75 See id. at 18. The sense of perpetual foreignness engendered by the immigrant
framework would have been damaging to the very groups these sociologists
studied. For a fuller discussion of the theories of ethnic economies, see IVAN
LIGHT & STEVEN J. GOLD, ETHNIC ECONOMIES 5–23 (2000).
76 Jennifer Lee, Retail niche domination among African American, Jewish, and Korean
entrepreneurs: Competition, coethnic advantage; and disadvantage, 42 AM. BEHAV.
SCI. 1398 (1999).
77 Id. See also NANCY ABELMANN & JOHN LIE, BLUE DREAMS: KOREAN AMERICANS
AND THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS 136 (1995).
72
73

9/9/2020 5:04 PM

DRAFT

2020]

ETHNICALLY SEGMENTED MARKETS

19

The paradigm shift to ethnic and immigrant entrepreneurs
paved the way for ethnographies of other communities, often in
fascinating contradistinction from co-racial groups. Scholars
compared entrepreneurship rates and strategies of Cuban
Americans to Mexican Americans, for instance, or Mexican
Americans to African Americans. 78 By unpacking the
intersections of ethnicity with race, class, and gender, they have
been able to distinguish ethnic communities prone to
entrepreneurship from racialized minorities who, due to
structural conditions or the absence of class and ethnic resources,
could not replicate the conditions necessary for widespread
business formation. 79
Undertaking comparative analyses, sociologists ascertained
that some ethnic groups thrived because they were able to
integrate vertically and horizontally. 80 Writing in 1982, Kenneth
Wilson and Allen Martin theorized that ethnic communities
utilizing in-group networks to organize in this way could
replicate the advantages of dominant firms in the mainstream
economy to squeeze out higher profits per unit of demand. 81 As
proof, they applied input–output econometric analyses to
compare the production capacities of Cuban Americans and
African Americans in Miami, finding that the former can source
from in-group firms and retain capital within co-ethnic
communities at far higher rates than the latter. 82 Vertical
integration has been observed between Korean American retailers
and suppliers as well. 83

See ZULEMA VALDEZ, THE NEW ENTREPRENEURS: HOW RACE, CLASS, AND
GENDER SHAPE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 26 (2011).
79 For a concise literature review, see Valdez, supra note 11, at 158.
80 See Kenneth L. Wilson & W. Allen Martin, Ethnic Enclaves: A Comparison of the
Cuban and Black Economies in Miami, 88 AM. J. SOCIOL. 135 (1982).
81 Id. at 138.
82 Id. at 143–47.
83 See Yoon, supra note 12, at 331:
78
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As we assemble the literature on ethnically segmented
markets, it is important to be mindful of sociology. Sociology
keeps legal scholars “honest” about ethnicity, so to speak, by
helping us stay attuned to the dynamism of racial and ethnic
formation.84 Recognizing that race and ethnicity are constructs
whose boundaries are fluid, we understand that the interethnic
conflict in ESM markets is not inevitable. Indeed, the static
representation of ethnicity—and therefore the inevitability of
ethnic conflict—was one of the many criticisms of Professor
Chua’s writings. 85 Generations pass and their descendants
acculturate; whatever the values or inclinations of first-generation
immigrant entrepreneurs, their children may feel differently
about the communities where they do business. 86
In return, there is much that antitrust can teach sociologists as
well. The literature on vertical integration in ethnic economies is
The vertical integration between Korean retailers and
suppliers is another strong feature of Korean immigrant
businesses . . . . Korean retailers say that they receive some
benefits or special services from Korean suppliers. For
example, extended credit terms, lower prices and easy access
to information are the main benefits gained from having
Korean suppliers. Since Korean suppliers dominate general
merchandise, clothing, footwear, and wig trades, Korean
retailers can get early information about which items have
recently arrived and which ones are “hot.”
84 On the process of racial formation, see OMI & WINANT, supra note 22.
85 See Edmund Terrence Gomez, Inter-ethnic Relations, Business and Identity: The
Chinese in Britain and Malaysia, in THE STATE, DEVELOPMENT AND IDENTITY IN
MULTI-ETHNIC SOCIETIES: ETHNICITY, EQUITY AND THE NATION 32 (Nicholas
Tarling & Edmund Terrence Gomez eds., 2008) (“[Chua’s] perspective tends to
homogenize ethnic communities and to essentialize their pattern of enterprise
development”); Miles, Chinese Diasporas, pp 256-257
86 See Elaine H. Kim, Home is Where the Han Is: A Korean American Perspective on
the Los Angeles Upheavals, in READING RODNEY KING, READING URBAN UPRISING
215 (Robert Gooding-Williams, ed., 1993). Concomitantly, we also see that
traumatic episodes such as the LA riots can accentuate ethnic solidarity. Rose
M. Kim, Violence and Trauma as Constitutive Elements in Korean American Racial
Identity Formation: The 1992 L.A. Riots/Insurrection/Saigu, 11 ETHNIC & RACIAL
STUD. 1999 (2011).
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now nearly half a century old.87 Some of it treats horizontal
coordination and vertical integration equivalently,88 as
tantamount to a monopoly.89 These are fighting words in
antitrust; there, the doctrine has developed frameworks for
thinking through when monopolies ensue, what monopolization
is, and when coordination and integration should be condemned.
C. Contributions from Economics
Economics is fundamental to our understanding of markets,
and economic principles heavily influence antitrust. For our
purposes, three lines of economic scholarship are informative.
First, there has been a longstanding debate about the relevance of
antidiscrimination laws—from an economics perspective. Among
the earliest, and certainly the loudest, volleys fired on this point
came from the Chicago economist Gary Becker, who posited that
racial discrimination is inefficient because it artificially steers
transactions toward in-group members rather than permitting
out-group but more efficient alternatives. 90 For instance, White
employers with a “taste for discrimination” might hire only White
workers even though Black workers might be more productive
and demand lower wages. 91 Over time, as his theory goes, the
markets would correct the distortions of discrimination by, with
nondiscriminators driving discriminators out of business. 92 In the

A similar strain is the “ethnic cartel” model. For a discussion, see RICHMAN,
STATELESS COMMERCE supra note 9, at 107–08.
88 See Wilson & Martin, supra note 77, at 137.
89 See LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 76, at 20–21 (“Korean business owners
monopolized the wig business before federal prosecutors brought suit under
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. While they enjoyed their monopoly, Korean
business owners excluded non-Koreans from the wig industry, and raised
prices of wigs to consumers.”).
90 See BECKER, supra note 4.
91 Id. at 19–21.
92 Id. at 43–45. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.1
(1972).
87
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above example, White employers would eventually gravitate
toward Black workers, forcing a stabilization of wages between
White and Black workers. With the markets’ self-correction,
antidiscrimination laws were unnecessary. 93
Becker’s thesis came at the height of U.S. antidiscrimination
laws and ushered in a conservative backlash rooted in shaky
microeconomic theory. The thesis has been thoroughly qualified,
if not utterly discredited, 94 though Professor Becker’s other
writings have influenced scholarship of ethnic entrepreneurs. 95
For our purposes, and as our second line of scholarship to
examine, it is the related discourse on the durability of market
segmentation that is more relevant. The lesson from the early
microeconomics-infused lens on race is that segregation is
inefficient. 96 As time takes its course, transactions should proceed
toward the equilibrium of efficiency. This hypothesis applies to
various settings, with the common theme that markets and
communities should move toward integration. Thus, across vastly
different industries, market segmentation is viewed as an
aberration. Financial markets are inefficient where producers are
siloed, fostering redundancy in market infrastructures. 97 Labor
unions are interpreted as artificial in addition to unjust where

See BECKER, supra note 4, at 45.
See, e.g., Robert E. Suggs, Poisoning the Well: Law & Economics and Racial
Inequality, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (2005).
95 See, e.g., Richman, Community Institutions, supra note 50, at 387–88 (accounting
for the possibility that that Jewish institutions developed and internalized
knowledge that allowed Jewish merchants to flourish in the diamond trade, in
accordance with Becker’s theory of human capital suggests); Cao, Communities
and Markets, supra note 9, at 865 n.84 (incorporating Becker’s work on norms
into an understanding of community norms surrounding informal contracts).
96 Becker himself posited that tastes for discrimination might grow large
enough to foster segregation and pre-empt intercommunal trade, to the
detriment of each isolated community’s welfare. See BECKER, supra note 4, at
22–23.
97 See Mike Reece, Competition or Consolidation?: The Outlook for Interoperability
Among European CCPs, THOUGHT (J.P. Morgan), May 1, 2012 (comparing the
siloed nature of financial market infrastructures in Europe versus the U.S.).
93
94
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peoples of color are excluded. 98 And trade barriers, a form of
geographic market segregation, are construed as artificial
distortions of price, which should otherwise trend toward
uniformity. 99
In diverse societies, then, the persistence of ethnically
segmented markets might be attributed to unnatural forces such
as interethnic suspicion. In Malawi, for example, the political
scientist Amanda Lea Robinson has analyzed the spatial
distribution of the country’s numerous ethnic groups and
concluded that ethnic market segmentation is partially the result
of intraethnic trust. 100 To minimize the risks of informal
commerce, farmers and traders opt to transact only with in-group
counterparties. 101
Nonetheless, ethnic groups can come to so dominate an
economic niche that consumers cannot turn to coethnic suppliers.
For an explanation, and as our third line of scholarship to
examine, some economists have turned to institutions peculiar to
those ethnicities. New institutional economics (“NIE”) defines
institutions as “written and unwritten rules, norms and
constraints that humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control
their environment.” 102 Broadly construed, institutions cover
written rules and agreements governing private relations,
constitutions and laws governing society, and unwritten codes of
conduct. 103 In his seminal book on institutions, for instance, Avner
Greif traces Western dominance to the development of
institutions during the medieval era that fostered growth.104 Most
Roithmayr, supra note 2, at 51.
See Robinson, supra note 5 (discussing the Law of One Price, which
hypothesizes that each product should have one price globally and where
disparities arise, they are due to trade frictions).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Claud Menard & Mary M. Shirley, Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Claud Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2008).
103 Id.
104 See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY:
LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (2006).
98
99
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prominently, it was the rise of corporations such as guilds,
fraternities,
and
professional
organizations—institutions
institution centered neither on state nor kin but on self-interest
and self-governance—that propelled Europe’s growth. 105
Given its emphasis on hard and soft law as institutions
fundamental to economic success, NIE has provided the
foundations for law scholars’ studies of ethnic economies. 106 As
we shall see, institutions spurred the ascension of Korean
merchants’ in the African American wigs and hair extensions
market. However, we will also move beyond intraethnic and
communal factors to evaluate Korean American strategies for
keeping competitors at bay. Because the market for the sale of
wigs and hair extensions to African Americans is ethnically
misaligned between consumers and producers, we must consider
the part that producers played in maintaining their edge over outgroup competitors—specifically, African American retailers,
whom consumers would likely have preferred.
Altogether, prior writings from law, sociology, and
economics point to the following quandary for ESM markets:
given the dynamism of racial and ethnic formation as well as the
transience and inefficiency of market segmentation, why are some
ethnically segmented markets perpetually misaligned? Existing
work (e.g., by NIE scholars) provides partial answers. But to fully
explicate this quandary, the remainder of the Article focuses on
one of the country’s most iconic but misunderstood ESM markets.

Id. See also Avner Greif, Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth: The Origins
and Implications of Western Corporations, 96 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 308 (2006).
106 See, e.g., RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE supra at 91, 169.
105
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III. THE Market FOR AFRICAN WIGS AND HAIR EXTENSIONS
Wigs and hair extensions manufactured for African American
consumption comprise an ethnically segmented product market.
African American hair is unique in texture and remarkably
versatile, capable of being molded into different styles as an
expression of personal style. 107 Yet with this versatility comes
fragility; excessive styling weakens the hair shaft so consumers
often cannot use products designed for other hair types.108
Products catering to African American hair, therefore, are
generally not substitutable by hair products for other ethnic
groups. 109
Unlike many other consumer products, however, wigs and
hair extensions are sold in an ethnically misaligned market
because retailers are predominantly firms owned by Korean
Americans. In the U.S., this is one of the most enduring markets
where buyers and sellers are ethnically misaligned.

Ingrid E. Roseborough & Amy J. McMichael, Hair Care Practices in AfricanAmerican Patients, 28 SEMIN CUTAN. MED. SURG. 103, (2009):
107

The unique properties of hair of African origin are conducive
to the expression of personal style.T he curved, ellipticallyshaped hair shaft lends itself to mouldable styles that retain
their form and texture. When heat or chemical agents are
applied to African hair, thes trands temporarily or
permanently release their intrinsic coil properties and can be
fashioned in innumerable ways. This immense diversity of
options for hair care is not without drawbacks. African hair is
innately fragile. The inappropriate use of styling aids may
weaken the hair shaft and lead to breakage, scalp
inflammation, and potentially permanent hair loss.
Id.
For example, African American hair generally requires more conditioning
to prevent dryness. For wigs and hair extensions, styles with tighter curl
pattern will generally be used more by African American consumers than
white or Asian consumers.
108
109
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Equally enduring is the interethnic tension that typifies
consumer–producer interactions. (By “producers,” this Article
refers generally to retailers of wigs and hair extensions for African
Americans.) Understandably, the fact that Korean Americans
dominate the sale of beauty products manufactured for African
Americans has been the source of consumer ire for decades.
Among other criticisms, African Americans routinely level
generalizations that these markets are concentrated and Koreans
have monopolized them. 110 Pervasive as these charges are, the
stranger feature is that they have been repeated by scholars—
often the scholars who built up the middleman minority
literature—without working through the prerequisites of
monopoly and monopolization. 111
This Section analyzes the retail of wigs and hair extensions to
African American as a paradigm of ESM markets. It begins with
the structural dynamics that propelled Korean American firms
into the markets. Then it discusses the tactics that these firms
utilize to sustain their control. Finally, with a view toward
infusing the discourse with greater methodological rigor, this
Section dissects the market power of Korean American retailers.
A. Structural Tailwinds
Today’s Korean American hair retailers owe their start to
macroeconomic changes at the domestic and international levels
in the late 1960s. Half a century ago, when South Korean

110 See, e.g., Emma Sapong, Roots of Tension: Race, Hair, Competition and Black
Beauty Stores, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO NEWS, Apr. 25, 2017,
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/04/25/black-beauty-shops-koreansuppliers-roots-of-tension-mn [https://perma.cc/EG7Y-DU7X]; GOOD HAIR
(HBO
Films
2009);
BLACK
HAIR
(2006),
available
at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p96aaTSdrAE; Lloneau, supra note 16.
See
also
BLACK
OWNED
HAIR
CHALLENGE,
https://www.blackownedhaircarechallenge.com/ (last accessed July 30,
2020).
111 See, e.g., LIGHT & GOLD, supra note 76, at 20–21.
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underwent its rapid economic development,112 wigs became one
of the country’s major exports. 113 Hair collectors traveled the
countryside of South Korea, offering cash to or even bartering
with women and girls in exchange for their hair. 114 Shorn hair was
bundled and sold to wholesalers, who then resold it to wig
factories. Wig manufacturing is labor-intensive: hair must be
combed and sorted for length; if the hair is natural, it must also be
disinfected, washed, curled, and dyed; finally, hair is then sewn
onto a cloth netting.115 Yet wage imbalances allowed wigs to be
made in South Korea, imported into the U.S., and then sold at
large markups. 116
By a twist of history, South Korean wig exports were greased
by anti-Communist policy during the Cold War. In the early
1960s, at the height of a hairpiece craze in the U.S., European
supplies of hair ran low, so U.S. manufacturers began to source
hair from China. 117 In 1965, however, the U.S. Treasury
Department suddenly banned the import of “Asiatic” hair, but
hair was allowed through the embargo if it could be traced to a
non-Communist source. 118 This move boosted the South Korean
wig industry while undercutting its Asian competitors.
Initially, South Korean wig imports were fueled by an
explosion in consumer demand, which grew 50-fold from 1960 to
1969. 119 At that time, the market was expanding so quickly that
See GREGG BRAZINSKY, NATION BUILDING IN SOUTH KOREA: KOREANS,
AMERICANS, AND THE MAKING OF A DEMOCRACY (2007).
113 LIGHT & BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 11, at 266
(“Korea exported 70 percent of the world’s human-hair wigs.”).
114 Petrulis, supra note 15, at 8. See also How Wigs Tell the Story of Modern South
Korea, ECONOMIST, Jul. 27, 2017.
115
Loretta
Hall,
Wig,
How
Products
Are
Made,
http://www.madehow.com/Volume-3/Wig.html (last accessed July 30,
2020).
116 See LIGHT & BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS, supra note 11, at 27–37;
Chin et al., supra note 15, at 494.
117 Petrulis, supra note 15, at 13.
118 Id. at 14–15.
119 See Leslie Gourse, What a Change of Hair Can Do, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1969.
112
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U.S. firms set up subsidiaries and stepped up sourcing. 120 Hong
Kong and South Korean businesses also rushed in. What
distinguished the Korean-operated supply chain from its U.S. and
Hong Kong counterparts, however, was its reliance on an
extensive network of large manufacturers, small distributors, and
a government-backed bank that stretched from South Korea to the
U.S. 121 State support was critical. Funded by the South Korean
government, the Korean Exchange Bank established a branch in
Los Angeles to lend to Korean American-owned firms, many of
them situated in the wig industry. 122 The bank even encouraging
these firms to borrow, thereby swelling the number of wig trading
companies in the early 1970s. 123
Korean-owned businesses in the U.S. built up a network of
wig wholesalers and retailers, all relying on each other. Koreanlanguage newspapers circulating in the U.S. advertised the
enterprises of Korean immigrants, which helped connect
immigrants; Korean importers also recruited Korean immigrants
as distributors. 124 Newcomers to the wig business could navigate
both financing and sourcing solely within the transnational
Korean community. Hence, social networks linked the disparate
players in the wig market.
The late 1960s and 1970s also coincided with shifting beauty
standards. This was the era of full beards and long hair, reflecting
an ethos of rebellion. For those consumers unable to naturally
look the part, hairpieces provided a substitute—though a costly
one. At the time, wigs were sourced from human hair, and Italian

Chin et al., supra note 15, at 494.
Id. at 499–501.
122 Id. at 498.
123 Id. at 499.
124 Yoon, supra note 12, at 322 (“Korean manufacturers sent their sales
representatives to black areas to open retail stores. Korean wig-importers
actively recruited Korean immigrants as retailers and peddlers in black areas
to expand their businesses. They even supplied wigs to Korean retailers on
credit, so that Korean immigrants could start their own wig businesses with
very little initial capital.”).
120
121
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hair was considered topshelf, with “Oriental” hair a distant
second. 125 Mixing animal hair was already in practice to concoct
even cheaper alternatives. 126 However, it was the invention of
Kanekalon by the Japanese conglomerate Kanekan in 1965 that
proved disruptive. 127
Possibly intended as a wool substitute, 128 and modeled on
Union Carbide’s fibers for fake fur and doll hair, 129 Kanekalon
was a synthetic thread that became an inexpensive substitute for
human hair. Korean wig manufacturers acquired the exclusive
right to use the thread and incorporated it into their products.130
Along with the technical breakthrough of stretch wigs, or hair
attached onto elastic caps, 131 Kanekalon helped South Korea
transform from an source of human hair to a manufacturer of
wigs. 132 By the mid-1970s, wigs had become South Korea’s third

A direct, if lengthy, quote from a chronicler of the time is illuminating on
multiple levels:
125

[T]raditional pacesetters are the hairpieces from Europe, led
by soft, shiny, olive-oil-nurtured Italian hair. It is far and away
the most expensive, with falls starting as high as $300 and full
wigs going for as much as $1,000 . . . . Spanish hair has been
under something of a cloud since the days when gypsies were
accused of kidnapping long-haired children, and returning
them shortn . . . . Oriental hair is in general coarser than the
European variety, and cheaper. A hairpiece of Oriental hair
costs roughly a third of the price of a comparable European
piece. Gourse, supra note 112, at 67-69.
126

See id. at 69.

See
About
Kaneka,
Kaneka,
https://www.kaneka.co.jp/en/corporate/chronicle/ (click on “1960~”).
128 Brooklyn White, How Black Women Fueled Kanekalon Hair’s Enduring Impact
on Pop Culture, StyleCaster, https://stylecaster.com/beauty/kanekalon-hairhistory/.
129 Gourse, supra note 112, at 69.
130 Yoon, supra note 12, at 111.
131 Gourse, supra note 112, at 69.
132 Chin et al., supra note 15, at 495.
127
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largest export. 133 For consumer standpoint, Kanekalon provided
a low-cost alternative to natural wigs, putting conformity to
fashion trends within nearly universal reach. 134
For African American women, who comprise a very specific
market segment, the mid-1970s marked a shift from the afros that
had defined the Civil Rights era to longer, straighter hair.135 This
was reflected in the cultural icons of the day, including Diana Ross
and Donna Summer. 136 Of course, hair is an individual’s
expression of identity, so we must not overgeneralize. We do
know, however, that emerging sources of natural and synthetic
hair from Asia brought down the prices of wigs, enabling more
consumers to look the era’s part. At a time when relaxers and
straight hair were coming back into style, synthetic wigs allowed
African American women to quickly change up hairstyles. 137
Synthetic wigs therefore ushered in throwaway fashion for
hair—a boon to Korean American wig retailers, who in the mid1970s were suffering from the deflation of their products, an
economic recession, weakening consumer demand, and
intensifying intraethnic competition. 138 Henceforth, these retailers
would have to do volume business to make up for diminishing
margins. Yet were it not for African American women, South
Korean manufacturers and Korean American retailers would
likely not have survived. In less than half a decade, consumption
Id. at 496.
See Gourse, supra note 112, at 69 (synthetic wigs cost $25, as opposed to the
$300 price tag for wigs from natural hair).
135 Previously, the late 1960s and early 1970s was the “golden era of wigs.”
Yoon, supra note 12, at 323.
136 For annals of their hair evolution, see Nikki Brown, Diana Ross’ Unmatched
Hair
Journey
Through
The
Years,
ESSENCE,
Feb.
8,
2017,
https://www.essence.com/celebrity/diana-ross-hair-journey/; Nicole Marie
Melton, Hairstyle File: Donna Summer's Iconic Tresses, ESSENCE, May 18, 2012,
https://www.essence.com/hair/hairstyle-file-donna-summers-tresstransformation/.
137 See AYANA BYRD & LORI THARPS, HAIR STORY: UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF
BLACK HAIR IN AMERICA 70–71 (2001).
138 YOON, supra note 12, at 112–13.
133
134
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of wigs in the U.S. contracted by nearly 40 percent, to a “core”
constituent of African Americans. 139 This group comprised a
lucrative and dependable segment, and because of the inroads
Korean Americans had already made into the market, they would
not be displaced.
Other seismic but fortuitous trends allowed Korean American
firms to consolidate control over the wigs and hair extensions
markets. As whites fled American cities, Korean American
retailers set up convenient stores, liquor stores, and hair care
businesses, taking advantage of cheap rents to open storefronts.140
Brick and mortar establishments gave owners direct access to the
consumers who would form their base, so that when styles
shifted, firms could quickly adapt by switching to newer
products. In this way, the early foray of Korean American retailers
conveyed this set of producers a first mover advantage which
made them difficult to unseat. 141 Their entry into the community
also signified the demise of door-to-door retailing of the 1930s, the
mainstay of black retailers who sold black-made beauty products
directly to black consumers. 142 In their place stood the brick and
mortar store, where Korean American retailers sold beauty
supplies manufactured in Korea to black consumers. 143
Of all the structural tailwinds enjoyed by Korean American
retailers, however, it is their comparative advantage over African
American competitors that has kept them ahead. In many
respects, a comparison of these two communities is a study in
contrasts. Where one group of producers has access to capital,
whether through rotating communal credit or state-backed
import–export banks, the other is shut out of mortgages, let alone

Petrulis, supra note 15, at 5.
See Sapong, supra note 107.
141 See id.
142 See BYRD & THARPS, supra note 130, at 32, 79
143 Id. at 34.
139
140
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business credit. 144 Where one group enjoys the patronage of a
sovereign government that during the 1960s was still a quasideveloping country but threw its entire weight behind its ethnic
compatriots, the other group has faced the systematic exclusion,
marginalization, and persecution by its own state, a world
superpower. No study of this ethnically misaligned market would
be complete without reference to the disparity in buyer and seller
economic power, and no study of that economic power would be
complete without mention of the headwinds African American
businesses perpetually face.
Nonetheless, Korean American dominance cannot be entirely
chalked up to structural or institutional advantages. The
innovation and success of African American entrepreneurs such
as Madam C.J. Walker, who pioneered hair straightening
products and a direct retailing strategy, shows that African
Americans can break through. 145 Nor is Walker an anomaly;
numerous other Black-owned hair care businesses have
flourished despite the headwinds. 146 For Korean American
retailers, then, we must also look at the role that this group played
in fanning those headwinds.
B. The Agency of Retailers
Structural trends may convey one set of producers an
advantage over others, but the advantages are ephemeral.
Structures shift, and advantages dissipate. This is especially the
case when producers and consumers are both communities of
color; the slight, relative advantages conveyed to each group
Cf. Yoon, supra note 12, at 494, with RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW:
A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 9–10
(2017).
145 BYRD & THARPS, supra note 130, at 35–36, 78–81. Walker was the first Black
self-made female millionaire. Id. at 183.
146
See Black-Owned Brands, BLACK OWNED HAIR CHALLENGE,
https://www.blackownedhaircarechallenge.com/black-owned-brands/ (last
accessed July 30, 2020).
144
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fades quickly, and relations between ethnically distinct producers
and consumers are ever fluid. 147 In other words, the dominance of
Korean American retailers could not have persisted through the
decades without the tactics utilized by Korean American retailers
themselves—i.e., without their agency.
For African American consumers in this ethnically
misaligned market, the offenses of out-group producers are
many. Consumers charge that Korean Americans have
monopolized the ethnic beauty products market, 148 shutting out
African American retailers by stifling the flow from
wholesalers. 149 And if African Americans have created new
beauty products, Korean American retailers refuse to carry
them. 150 African Americans have leveled so many charges at
Korean American retailers that the Internet is replete with these
claims and the producer–consumer relationship is clouded by a
generalized, if amorphous, mistrust. 151
In truth, the relationship between African American
consumers and Korean American suppliers had been poised for
decades, for reasons beyond the inability of competitors to
penetrate the hair markets. 152 African Americans had long
See supra note 82.
Lloneau, supra note 16 (“The Koreans control over 85% of all ethnic hair care
products sold in Beauty Supply Stores without regard as to who is the
manufacture.”).
149 MadameNoire, Why Do Koreans Own The Black Beauty Supply Business?, Sept.
27, 2010, https://madamenoire.com/104753/why-do-koreans-own-the-blackbeauty-supply-business/ [https://perma.cc/AKY3-VF56 ] (“Today, there are
over 9,000 Korean-owned beauty supply stores serving a billion dollar market
for Black hair. Between manufacturing, distributing and selling these hair care
products, Korean entrepreneurs appear to control all major components. . . .
[T]here are only four central distributors serving beauty supply stores in the
country and these Korean owned distributors discriminate against Black store
owners in order to maintain their monopoly in the market.”).
150 See BLACK HAIR, supra note 107.
151 See supra notes 106, 141.
152 See CLAIRE JEAN KIM, BITTER FRUIT: THE POLITICS OF BLACK–KOREAN
CONFLICT IN NEW YORK CITY (2000); Heon Cheol Lee, Conflict between Korean
147
148
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complained of mistreatment by Korean-owned businesses and
periodically organized boycotts against them.153 In 1992, these old
grievances exploded into protests that destroyed Korean
businesses in Los Angeles after the acquittal of Latasha Harlins’s
killer and Rodney King’s assailants. 154
Charges of exclusion find some support in the literature from
sociology about ethnic entrepreneurship. Consistent with Wilson
and Martin’s finding that Cuban American entrepreneurs pool
resources within their co-ethnic communities, 155 Korean
American retailers deal almost exclusively with Korean and
Korean American wholesalers. 156 Wholesalers are more likely to
extend credit, offer installment payment plans, and sell at lower
prices to co-ethnic retailers, which can be important to thinly
capitalized startups. 157 A degree of informality characterizes
Korean American in-group commercial transactions; rather than
checking a supplier’s credit, wholesalers often transact through
“handshake deals.” 158 These busines customs are emblematic of
what sociologists call “vertical integration,” whereby materials
are sourced from, spending restricted to, and wealth retained in
co-ethnic communities. 159 Conceptually, the application of
vertical integration to an entire ethnic group is slightly different
than the approach of antitrust law, which tends to examine
vertical integration at the firm or industry level. Nonetheless,
ethnic cohesion characterizes Korean American ventures in a
variety of industries, mostly concentrated in low-income
communities of color, from apparel to ethnic beauty supplies.

Merchants and Black Customers: A Structural Analysis, in KOREANS IN THE HOOD:
CONFLICT WITH AFRICAN AMERICANS 113 (Kwang Chung Kim ed., 1999).
153 See KIM, supra note 145, at 145–46.
154 See Park, supra note 61; Oliver et al., supra note 61.
155 See Wilson & Martin, supra note 77.
156 Lee, supra note 73.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.; Wilson & Martin, supra note 77.
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While a vertically integrated wig and hair extensions market
keeps wealth from flowing out of the Korean American
community, it excludes participation by African American
competitors. Given the market’s evolution, very few African
American suppliers of wigs and hair products exist, 160 and they
have been unable to procure hair products from Korean American
distributors. 161 African American manufacturers have also faced
difficulty convincing Korean American retailers to carry their
products. 162 This can be attributed partly to language barriers; for
product catalogs and even industry magazines are frequently
published only in Korean. 163 Yet Korean and Korean American
wholesalers have banded together in the past to shut out
competitors, going well beyond the passive exclusion of
language.
In 1975, the Department of Justice brought suit against the
Korean Hair Goods Association of America, Inc. (the
“Association”) for (i) conspiring to regulate the price and resale
conditions of imported wigs and (ii) excluding wig importers and
distributors from the resale market. 164 The Association was a New
York organization whose members imported wigs and hair
products from Korea for wholesale and retail in the U.S. 165 Noting
that most wigs sold in the U.S. are made out of synthetic fibers
But see Black-Owned Brands, supra note 139. https://18530fa3-d2e0-49d5a67b522187070841.filesusr.com/ugd/182cb9_81b90ee249eb43f288e60510c6938688.
pdf.
161 MadameNoire, supra note 142.
162 See BLACK HAIR, supra note 107, at frame 5:50 (Kizure, a Black-owned
manufacturer of curling irons and other styling tools, allegedly blacklisted
from Korean American-owned shops).
163 See, e.g., BEAUTY TIMES: THE MAGAZINE FOR THE ETHNIC BEAUTY INDUSTRY,
http://www.beautytimes.com/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2020). See also BLACK HAIR,
supra note 107, at frame 2:57.
164 See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Notice of Proposed Consent Judgment and
Competitive Impact Statement Thereon, 40 Fed. Reg. 57696 (1975) [hereinafter
DOJ Consent Decree Notice].
165 Id. at 57698.
160
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and that the “vast majority” of synthetic wigs are manufactured
in South Korea and imported to the U.S.,166 the Department of
Justice contended that the Association regulated the price and
distribution of wigs by restricting its membership and working
with an association South Korean wig manufacturers and
exporters (the “KEA”) to channel the distribution of wigs through
the Association. 167 Although DOJ brought suit under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act,168 this was a scheme of using exclusion to
facilitate price maintenance, as seen in classic Section 2 cases. 169 In
the end, the consent decree enjoined the Association from: (i)
fixing wig prices, (ii) preventing the procurement of wigs for
resale, informational exchanges designed to fix prices, (iii)
communicating its membership to the KEA, and (iv)
unreasonably restricting its membership. 170
The Association’s consent decree offered a lens into how the
Korean American distribution chain for wigs and hair extensions
was able to consolidate its hand in the U.S. market. However, it is
tantalizingly short. It also stands as the only proceeding that
delves into the workings of this market with any rigor. Ultimately,
the Justice Department’s legal action shows that the charges of
African American consumers and competitors are not mere
speculation—that as far back as 1972, the Korean American
distribution chain was attempting to fix prices and resale
conditions for wigs and hair extensions. 171 To fill in the analytical
gaps in the consent decree and infuse the charges of African
American consumers and competitors with rigor, we must work
through the requisite steps under antitrust law. Otherwise, the
charges languish in imprecision. The next Section undertakes that
work.
Id.
Id.
168 See U.S. v. Korean Hair Goods Ass’n of Am., Inc., 1976 WL 1219 (S.D.N.Y.).
169 E.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85
(1984); JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc. (7th Cir. 1999).
170 Korean Hair Goods Ass’n of Am., Inc., 1976 WL.
171 40 Fed. Reg. at 57698.
166
167
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IV. Market POWER OF KOREAN AMERICAN RETAILERS
This Section uses antitrust theory and doctrine on market
power to more clearly frame the presence of Korean American
retailers. To be condemned, many exclusionary and coordinating
practices require a finding of market power as the very first
step. 172 Market power is easy to express conceptually—the power
of a producer to raise prices above competitive levels—but often
difficult to prove in practice. 173
Frequently, market power is gauged through the indirect
steps of defining the relevant market and then measuring the
defendants’ market shares. While the market definition/market
share paradigm has come under assault through the decades, 174 it
remains the most popular means of assessing market power.
More importantly for our purposes, this paradigm generates
broader insights about the preferences and pressures of African
Americans, which might be missed if we were to assess market
power more directly—for instance, by going straight to
anticompetitive effects. 175
This Section begins by discussing the application of the
market definition/market share paradigm to the retail of wigs
and hair extensions to African Americans. The it moves onto other
conceptualizations of market power. It concludes with an
examination into how antitrust doctrine would have to be
expanded for African American competitors and consumers to
bring suit against Korean American producers.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at § 3.1.
At its core, market power gauges the difference between position of the
accused firm and a competitive counterfactual. Daniel A. Crane, Market Power
Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31, 37 (2014).
174 See, e.g., See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV.
437, 440 (2010).
175 This is especially the case for dynamic industries. See Shelanski, Information,
Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet, U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1673–74
(2013).
172
173
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A. Oblique Measures of Market Power
1. Market definition
For wigs and hair extensions, market definition is not
difficult, but the exercise can be enlightening. 176 Despite our
preliminary focus on the products themselves (e.g., wigs), the
complaints of monopoly and monopolization emanate from the
retail market, where the interaction between consumers and
producers happens to be most ethnically misaligned. In the retail
of wigs and hair extensions to African Americans, which occurs
mostly in brick and mortar stores, commerce is dominated by
Korean American-owned shops. 177 Consumer–producer frictions
coincide with—and are therefore augmented by—interracial
tensions.
The product market clearly encompasses brick and mortar
stores, where African American women typically procure wigs
and extensions. Stores provide convenient access to myriad
products; consumers can easily compare prices, textures, and
colors, especially for last-minute purchases prior to a trip to the
salon. Demand, especially in the form of traditional storefronts, is
inelastic—one of the two common features of a precisely defined
market (the other feature being supply inelasticity). 178
Demand for wigs and extensions is inelastic due to social
preferences that are often infused into law. In the U.S., long,
straight hair is favored over other styles, a predisposition that

176 Wigs and extensions are also lumped together in BLACK HAIR, supra note
107, at frame 0:28 (“Even though African Americans make up only 10% of the
American population, they buy 70% of all wigs and extensions . . .”).
177 See Lloneau, supra note 16; Sapong, supra note 107; MadameNoire, supra note
141.
178 HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 93.
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reflects the markers of whiteness. 179 Because blackness is defined
in opposition to whiteness, 180 the natural hair of African
Americans, who are racialized as Black, has often been viewed as
undesirable. 181 Thus, products from relaxers to hair extensions
cater to these preferences. 182 Of course, social preferences are
fluid, and natural hair has been celebrated, if episodically. 183
The law has internalized these norms into its systems of
incentives. In several jurisdictions, employers can fire or demote
employees for how they wear their hair, with no repercussions. 184
Hair discrimination cannot necessarily be couched as legally
actionable discrimination under Title VII. 185 And the closer one
gets to the textured appearance of natural hair, the more one

See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of
Analysis under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1193 (2010) (“society’s normative ideal
for women’s hair [is] straight hair, which hangs down as it grows longer—hair
that is not naturally grown by black women”).
180 FLOYA ANTHIAS & NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, RACIALIZED BOUNDARIES: RACE,
NATION, GENDER, COLOUR, AND CLASS AND THE ANTI-RACIST STRUGGLE 1992);
CAROL ANDERSON, WHITE RAGE: THE UNSPOKEN TRUTH OF OUR RACIAL DIVIDE
(2016); IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(2d 3d. 2006).
181 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 160, at 1107 (“In a society where straight, long,
fine hair (compared to black hair) is viewed not only as the norm but as the
ideal for women, tightly coiled black hair easily becomes categorized as
unacceptable, unprofessional, deviant, and too political.”). See also Matt
Donnelly, Inside ‘America’s Got Talent’: Ousted Judges Had Complained of Toxic
Culture, VARIETY, Nov. 26, 2019 (actress Gabrielle Union criticized by the
producers of the show America’s Got Talent for hairstyles that were “too black”).
182 Roseborough & McMichael, supra note 104, at 105 (“relaxer is a chemical
compound applied at varying intervals to permanently break hydrogen
disulfide bonds along the hair shaft and release the tight curl pattern.”).
183 E.g., 1960s, black is beautiful movement, and arguably today.
184 See D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (And Other Race-Based
Characteristics) Got To Do With It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1370–75 (2008)
(analyzing Eatman v. United Parcel Service, 194 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
and other cases).
185 Greene, supra note 165.
179
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hazards exclusion, termination, or demotion.186 Even where legal
protections exist, African Americans understand that natural or
natural-looking hair can hinder professional advancement. 187
Although we are defining our market as the retail of wigs and
extensions, it is still illuminating to analyze the products sold.
One theme that emerges from doing so is the socially embedded
inelasticity of demand for items that produce straight hair. This
inelasticity spills over to retail and puts consumers at the mercy
of retailers. 188 The second theme is that not all African American
hair products are fungible. Even though many products have
been invented to alter the length and texture of African American
hair, 189 these products are not reasonably interchangeable because
the associated processes are different: relaxers chemically alter the
texture of hair coils, sometimes at the risk of chemical burns, while
wigs and extensions are worn over hair to alter the apparent
length and curl pattern. And interchangeability is the hallmark of
market definition: all products that are reasonably
interchangeable, or can substitute for one another, must factor
into product market definition. 190
Even within wigs and extensions, we can further distinguish
products on two additional fronts. First, there is a difference
In Eatman, African American UPS drivers were told to cover
“unconventional” hairstyles, “which included dreadlocks, braids, corn rolls, a
dew rag, and a ponytail. 194 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
187 See Donnelly, supra note 162.
188 The consequences are not merely economic. African Americans have long
complained of condescending treatment by Korean American shopkeepers, a
complicated dynamic that is informed partially by the need for products sold
and the lack of alternative venues. See. . . Of course, counterexaplmes abound.
See . . . stories of solidarity
189 See Roseborough & McMichael, supra note 104, at 104–06; Onwuachi-Willig,
supra note 162, at 1089.
190 See U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394, 400, 404 (1956);
Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). This is the concept of crosselasticity: where substitutes are many, cross-elasticity is high. Yet
interchangeability and cross-elasticity are prone to error. See Kaplow, supra
note 156, at 482–91 (explaining why elasticity should be emphasized over crosselasticity).
186
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between products that replicate tighter curls versus products that
mimic straight hair. Wigs and extensions might perform similar
functions, more textured hairpieces might not be good substitutes
for straight hairpieces. Second, there is a difference between wigs
and extensions made from human hair and those made from
synthetic materials. The former is much higher quality and more
expensive than the latter; and even within human hair, there are
gradations.191 For our purposes, we focus on human hair, which
entails a different supply chain than synthetic hair. Again, we note
that wigs and hair extensions are not the same as the venue in
which they are sold—here, we focus primarily on the latter.
As for supply elasticity, assessment comes with
complications as well. After displacing door-to-door salespeople,
storefronts enjoyed a decades-long lock on the retail market.
Offering immediate access to a variety and large quantities of
products, traditional stores seem to have even fended off
challenges from newer outlets such as Internet sales and salondriven sales. 192 Our market should be defined as all retailers to
encompass these newer outlets; even so, with brick and mortar
stores predominating, the daylight is slim between all retailers
and physical stores.
Nonetheless, supplier elasticity is difficult to pin down
because there is a glut of firms in any geographic market for
consumers to choose from—those firms just happen to be mostly
owned and operated by Korean Americans. In the retail of wigs
and hair extensions to African Americans, competition is intense.
It was intraethnic competition, after all, that helped drive the
industry toward decline in the 1970s. 193 Yet despite the abundance
of retailers, there are very few non-Korean alternatives. Can it be
said, then, that this market is characterized by supplier inelasticity
if we consider only the number of firms? Whatever the
For example, Remy hair, where cuticles are intact and going in the same
direction, is considered to be higher end.
192 See infra notes 187 and 188 and accompanying discussion.
193 YOON, supra note 12, at 112–13.
191
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conclusion, the picture of a supply network that competes
intensely within itself but cooperates to exclude competition from
out-group insurgents.
To be sure, challengers have managed to break through.
Instead of procuring wigs and extensions from Korean
wholesalers, however, they rely on nontraditional sourcing.
Mayvenn, a Black-owned retailer that started in 2012 and is
funded by Serena Williams and venture capital powerhouse
Andreessen Horowitz, sources hair from China and sells either
directly to consumers or through salons. 194 Indique, co-founded
in 2007 by African American and Indian American partners,
sources from India, where hair is donated as part of religious
ceremonies, and sells products through its proprietary salons.195
The extent of consumer preference for these upstarts is difficult to
quantify, these alternatives do not command a substantial share
of the product market yet. 196
As a harbinger of imminent troubles, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection recently seized 13 tons of shipments of human
hair imports from China. 197 The hair was alleged to have been
shorn from Uighur internees at concentration camps in Xinjiang,

Susan Adams, Long on Hair: The World’s First Venture-Backed Human-HairExtension Company Wants To Be The Airbnb of Salons, FORBES, Sept. 27, 2019;
About Us, MAYVENN, https://shop.mayvenn.com/about-us (last accessed July
30, 2020).
195
See
Our
Company,
INDIQUE
HAIR
EXTENSIONS,
https://www.indiquehair.com/pages/our-company (last accessed July 30,
2020).
196 Mayvenn has been valued at $100 million, while the entire hair extensions
market is valued at $6 billion. See Adams, supra note 176. Its valuation does not
necessarily reflect its current share of the market, only its potential. Of course,
much more in-depth empirical work must be done to break out exactly how
much of that $6 billion figure pertains to African American consumers and
what share Mayvenn and traditional retailers control of that sector.
197 Withhold Release Orders and Findings, U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
https://www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/forcedlabor/withhold-release-orders-and-findings (search under “China” and
entries 33 and 34 for “Hair Products”).
194
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western China, for Muslim minorities. 198 Muslim internment is
one of the worst ongoing violations of human rights in the
world; 199 any supply chain entangled, or even alleged to
implicate, the labor or body parts of internees could stain an entire
industry. 200 At the very least, if Chinese hair continues to generate
controversy, then it will prove to be an unstable source for
insurgent retailers such as Mayvenn.
2. Market share calculation
With the above considerations in mind, let us define the
market as the brick-and-mortar retail of wigs and extensions
made from human hair for consumption by African Americans.
From here, market share calculation can reveal with greater
precision the extent of dominance by Korean American suppliers.
By most accounts, Korean American businesses control
approximately 70–85 percent of the “ethnic beauty products”
market. 201 Vastly more research must be done to measure the
market share of Korean American businesses in the relevant
markets. However, the anecdotal evidence from African
American consumers is that purchasing wigs and hair extensions
invariably requires navigating Korean-owned stores. 202
Even if “saturation” of the relevant markets by Korean
American businesses is assumed, market share analysis will
See Martha Mendoza, U.S. Customs Seizes 13-Ton Shipment of Human Hair
Weaves, Believed to Have Been Cut From Prisoners in Chinese Internment Camps,
TIME, July 1, 2020; Shalway Evans, That Hair You Just Bought Could Be From an
Internment Camp in China, ESSENCE, July 2, 2020.
199 See Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS
(June
30,
2020),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang;
Marlise Simons Uighur Exiles Push for Court Case Accusing China of Genocide, N.Y.
Times, July 6, 2020.
200 See Mendoza.
201 See, e.g., Sapong, supra note 107 (70%); Lee, supra note 73 (80%); Lloneau,
supra note 16 (85%).
202 See, e.g., BLACK HAIR, supra note 107.
198
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almost certainly fail traditional measures of concentration
because numerous small firms play in our ESM market.
Customarily, market dominance is attributed to one very large
producer (a monopoly) or a small number of fairly large
producers (say, an oligopoly of four or five producers). 203 Yet
because producers are small and compete intensely, this feature
belies our typical understanding of concentration.
Very few detailed studies have been conducted on the
numbers of ethnic beauty stores (where wigs and extensions are
sold) in a geographic market. One study by the sociologist
Jennifer Lee, who relied on interviews with Korean proprietors,
pegged the number of ethnic beauty supply stores in New York
City at 300, with 80 percent of them “Korean owned.” 204 Professor
Lee’s interviews took place in three largely African American
neighborhoods in New York: East Harlem, West Harlem, and
Jamaica, Queens. 205 While she does not specify the numbers of
stores in each neighborhood, we can take Jamaica as an example
and assume that (1) it comprises a relevant geographic market
and (2) it has 20 such stores. 206 Further, if we assume that the
intense competition among Korean American retailers yields a

Of course, the power of numerous small producers can be augmented if they
band together—say, through a trade association. In American Colum & Lumber
Co., for example, the American Hardwood Manufacturers’ Association was
comprised of approximately 400 members, with 365 of them engaged in the
information exchange plan. 257 U.S. 377, 391 (1921). In National Society of
Professional Engineers, the society’s worldwide membership was 69,000, and
consulting engineers, who were at the heart of the no-bid rule, numbered
12,000. 435 U.S. 679, 682 (1978).
204 Lee, supra note 73.
205 Id.
206 The African American population in Queens is 148,800 (62% of 240,000
residents). https://furmancenter.org/neighborhoods/view/jamaica-hollis.
This comprises approximately 7.5% of New York’s 1.992 million African
Americans. https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/newyorkcitynewyork. If we
take Professor Lee’s figures to be accurate, 7.5% of 300 is 22.5 ethnic beauty
stores for our geographic market. Indeed, a quick Google maps search of
“ethnic beauty supply Jamaica Queens” returns 22 results.
203
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market where no single supplier runs away with market share,
then our shares might look something like this:
Firm
Market Share (%)
Firm Market Share (%)
1
13
11
4
2
12
12
4
3
8
13
3
4
7
14
3
5
6
15
3
6
6
16
3
7
5
17
2
8
5
18
2
9
5
19
2
10
5
20
2
Table 1. Hypothetical Market Shares in a Relevant Geographic
Market
We can start with the k-firm concentration ratio, setting k at 4
to get the commonly utilized four-firm concentration ratio, or the
sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in the market.
Here the four-firm ratio would be 40. 207 A more precise measure
is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (“HHI”), or the sum of the
squares of the market shares of all firms. Under the above
hypothetical, the HHI would be 682, which does not even cross
the threshold of moderate concentration.208
If all but three of firms (assume, e.g., Firms 7–10) were owned
by Korean Americans, then the Korean-owned firms would
See, e.g., William G. Shepherd, Concentration Ratios, in NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (1st ed. 1987); Dep’t of Justice, Merger Guidelines
(1968).
208 U.S. Department of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 5.3
(2010). The HHI is the more commonly used index of concentration today, but
both measures have their flaws. HHI captures the differences in firm size more
accurately but errs on overestimating the importance of that difference, while
the four-firm concentration ratio overlooks and undervalues firm size
disparity. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at § 12.4a2.
207
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occupy 80% of the market, but concentration is typically not
measured in this way. 209 Instead, concentration is assessed at the
level of individual firms.
While the above illustration is purely conjecture, it
incorporates an important insight from the literature on Korean
American small businesses: that they crowd into specific niches
and compete intensely against one another. 210 The success of one
enterprise prompts others to start a competing enterprise, often in
close proximity to the first. 211
B. Retailer Diversity
Our defined market would likely not qualify as concentrated
under the market definition/market share paradigm. However,
there are other measures of market power whose application to
antitrust maybe be more appropriate, if experimental. As a salient
example, economists have proposed looking at the way ecologists
measures biological diversity, by assessing the richness and
evenness of a geographical habitat, where richness “is the number
of different kinds of organisms or species” and evenness
“compares the similarity of the population size of each of the
species.” 212 Applying these measures to the market for wigs and
hair extensions, we would find that richness is negligible, and
evenness skews toward a lopsided quantity of Korean American
firms. This result is equivalent in ecology to a habitat dominated
by one species. 213
209 Note that Black Owned Hair Care Challenge only has one African American
retailer
listed
for
Queens.
See
https://18530fa3-d2e0-49d5-a67b522187070841.filesusr.com/ugd/182cb9_81b90ee249eb43f288e60510c6938688.
pdf.
210 See YOON, supra note 12, at 112–13.
211 Id.
212 Paolo M. Adajar et al., The Surprising Hybrid Pedigree of Measures of Diversity
and Economic Concentration 11, Working Paper 26512 (2019),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w26512.
213 Id.
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Biologists and ecologists quantify richness and evenness
through the Simpson’s Diversity Index, which expresses the
probability “that two organisms chosen at random and
independently from the population will be found to belong to the
same species.” 214 The Index shifts the analysis from the level of
individual organisms to the level of species. Incidentally, HHI
incorporates aspects of richness and evenness as well; for
instance, squaring firm market shares augments the effect of (and
therefore accounts for) disparities in firm size. Still, the Simpson’s
Diversity Index gives us license to think of a market in terms of its
producer diversity, providing the theoretical basis to look beyond
individual firms and at the level of ethnic groups.
The Simpson’s Diversity Index has not been adapted to
antitrust contexts, 215 though diversity has featured prominently
in some antitrust-adjacent areas of law. Telecommunications law,
for instance, has grappled with viewpoint diversity in the midst
of media consolidation, 216 with the Federal Communications
Commission once proposing a diversity index based on the HHI
to identify media markets where cross-ownership limits should
be retained. 217 Antitrust scholars have also suggested alternatives
to the narrow focus on price and efficiency, upholding diversity
in markets where rivals compete on nonprice differentiation. 218 In
close cases such as ours, where traditional market power
Id. at 12. See also Edward H. Simpson, The Measurement of Diversity, 163
NATURE 688 (1949).
215 But see Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton & Jacob Nussim, Regulation of Book Markets,
97 WASH. U. L. REV. 835, 895 n.425 (2020).
216 See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media
Consolidation: An Empirical Study, 61 STAN. L. REV. 781 (2009).
217 See Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R.
13620, 13775 (2003). After legal challenges, the index was dropped See
Prometheus Radio Project v. F.C.C., 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
218 See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach
to Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007). Relatedly, on the use of
competition law to advance small and medium-sized businesses, particularly
in countries where an ethnic minority controls commerce, see Fox, supra note
43.
214
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paradigms yield ambivalent results, diversity might call for
antitrust intervention.
The wig and extensions market is an apt setting to test the
viability of principles such as diversity and consumer choice.
Retailers compete intensely, eroding margins and pushing prices
toward convergence. 219 The products themselves are fairly
homogenous, varying only in texture, length, and curl pattern.
What distinguishes retailers from one another, then, is
convenience, selection, and, perhaps most importantly, the ethnic
identities of each firm’s managers and owners. These three
factors—convenience, selection, and identity—are important to
consumers and balance one another in nuanced ways. Yet only
the ethnic identities of retailers are meaningful to market power.
From that standpoint, the prevalence of Korean American-owned
firms makes this market extremely concentrated, with this group
wielding market power.
There are reservations, though, with this conceptualization of
diversity, which pits Korean American retailers against African
American competitors and consumers. Racial and ethnic
formation is a dynamic, contested process, 220 but this strain of
market power analysis reduces Korean Americans to one
homogenous block and African Americans to another,
extrapolating the degree of diversity from their ratio. In reality, so
many factors influence racial and ethnic formation that it is
understood to be ever fluid. 221 Racial order is transient and should
be historically situated. 222 To the extent that race signifies “social
conflicts and interests” embedded in human bodies, 223 its
meaning constantly shifts as those conflicts and interests reorient
themselves.
YOON, supra note 12, at 112–13.
NADIA Y. KIM, IMPERIAL CITIZENS: KOREANS AND RACE FROM SEOUL TO LA xiv
(2008).
221 Omi and Winant break race into three critical factors: ethnicity, class, and
nation. See OMI & WINANT, supra note 22, at 11–13.
222 OMI & WINANT, supra note 22, at 61.
223 Id. at 55.
219
220
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Among Korean American shopkeepers, whom we presume
to constitute a uniform block for the purpose of assessing market
power, there are notable differences. Many did not stand with
Soon Ja Du, who fatally shot Latasha Harlins in 1992. 224 Then, as
today, Korean Americans have worked with African Americans
to build up their communities in pan-racial solidarity.225 More
pointedly, Korean American retailers may be pursuing divergent
sourcing strategies. The re-entry of China as a global hair
supplier, 226 coupled with Internet platforms such as Alibaba,
allows Korean American retailers to bypass co-ethnic wholesalers
just as much as it allows African American competitors an
alternative source of products.
The above factors complicate the picture of Korean American
solidarity, either as an ethnic unit or as a production unit.
Ultimately, then, any metric of market power that aggregates the
multitudes of discrete retailers, even if to assess market diversity,
does so at the expense of intraethnic nuance.
C. Anticompetitive Effects
Finally, to avoid the pitfalls of market diversity and market
definition/market share, we can attempt to detect market power
through direct evidence of anticompetitive effects.227

KIM, supra note 213 (L.A. Korean community asserting Du was “mentally
unbalanced”). The community also blamed mainstream American media for
inflaming violence, by relentlessly airing footage of the shooting, glossing over
White mistreatment of both Korean Americans and African Americans. Id. at
73.
225 Of course, episodes such as Los Angeles 1992 can reinforce ethnic cohesion.
Kim, supra note 83.
226 I say “re-entry” because in the 1960s, China was a significant supplier until
the U.S. banned the import of Chinese hair products. BLACK HAIR, supra note
106.
227 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (direct
evidence of Microsoft’s monopoly power).
224
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Unfortunately, there is as much disagreement over what
constitutes direct evidence as there is over market definition. 228
One long-established form of direct evidence is exclusionary
conduct; for courts have inferred market power from the power
to exclude competition. 229 In our case, this requires looking to the
upstream market of wig and extensions wholesale and
distribution, which is a necessary input into the retail of these
products. An exclusionary strategy might proceed as follows: a
consortium of wig and extensions wholesalers and distributors,
all Korean American firms, refuses to sell products to nonKoreans. The consortium might explicitly refuse to deal with any
non-Korean retailers, or it might conspire with South Korean wig
manufacturers to export only to the consortium, rather than
selling directly to any retailer based in the U.S. This was the very
strategy of the Korean Hair Goods Association of America, Inc.
(the “Association”) when DOJ brought suit in 1975. The
Association collaborated with the association of South Korean wig
manufacturers and exporters (“KEA”) to restrict the flow of wigs
to its competitors in the U.S. by, among other strategies,
mandating that import and distribution flow through the
Association rather than directly to retailers. 230 Because most wigs
were manufactured in Korea at the time, 231 this maneuver choked
off the supply line for out-group competitors. KEA and the
Association both enjoyed market power in their respective
markets—the manufacture and export of wigs in South Korea and
the important and distribution of wigs into the U.S.

See Crane, supra note 166, at 45 (summarizing seven mechanisms of direct
evidence from lower court decisions).
229 See id. at 45 n.82 (citing Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d
219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006); Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d
485, 500 (2d Cir. 2004); PepsiCo., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 107 (2d
Cir. 2002); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 n.2 (6th Cir.
2002); Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998)).
230 See DOJ Consent Decree, 40 Fed. Reg.
231 Id. at 57698.
228
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To a large extent, claims of exclusion have not abated today.
African American retailers routinely complain that Korean
wholesalers refuse to deal with them, thereby shutting them out
of hair products to resell. 232 However, exclusion as an indicator of
market power is difficult to square, both doctrinally and within
the wig and extensions market specifically.
While some courts have endorsed the inference of market
power from exclusionary conduct, 233 this inference is beset by
circularity because recovery for exclusion is permitted only if the
alleged excluder possesses market power. 234 One widely
recognized exception to this circularity is where the excluders are
able to raise their rivals’ costs. 235 Examples abound of such
exclusionary schemes—for example, the foreclosure or denial of
access of to a necessary input by incumbents signals their market
power. 236 In the wig and extensions market, the clearest instance
of this type of exclusion would be any concerted effort among
Korean manufacturers, wholesalers, or distributors to deny
African American retailers access to hair products. If that
transpires, then the insurgents would have to find new sources of
BLACK HAIR, supra note 107.
See, e.g., Brooke Groupe Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209 (1993).
234 Crane, supra note 166, at 64–65.
235 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986)
236 This is the crux of the essential facilities claim, which is established if: (1) a
monopolist controls a facility that (2) a competitor is unable to practically or
reasonably duplicate and (3) use of the facility is denied to the claimant, even
though (4) it is feasible for the monopolist to provide access. MCI Commc’ns
Corp. v. Am. Tel & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983). For its case
law lineage, see Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540
U.S. 398, 415 (2004); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 611 (1985), Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382
(1973), and United States v. Terminal R.R Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 41113 (1912). For examples, see, e.g., [prior work redacted for anonymity]. For
theoretical support, see Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, A Primer on Foreclosure, in 3
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2147, 2155 (Mark Armstrong &
Robert H. Porter eds., 2007).
232
233
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raw materials (e.g., hair from India) and possibly manufacture the
hair products themselves. 237 Or insurgents would have to source
manufactured products from someplace other than South
Korea. 238
Proving exclusionary conduct by Korean American
importers, wholesalers, and distributors is not difficult. There
appear to be only a few such firms (as opposed to nearly 10,000
retailers), which more easily facilitates coordination; collectively,
these firms wield market power.239 It is an altogether different
matter, however, to prove that this exclusion raises the costs of
African American retailers. The rise of China as a source of wigs
and extensions may be drastically cutting suppliers’ costs.
Relatedly, the fact that hair in India is donated means that raw
material costs might be even lower if South Korea is bypassed.
More work must be done to figure out the margins of sourcing
from South Korea versus China and India. For now, the fact that
some African American competitors are thriving—and two are
outright thriving—amidst the exclusion undercuts any argument
of Korean market power.
Exclusion is commonly a consequence of vertical integration.
Wholesalers and resellers, or an upstream facility and a
downstream monopolist, must be unified to some degree for them
to foreclose markets or raise rivals’ costs. To be sure, ethnic bonds
go a long way toward fostering commercial cohesion, 240 but the
vertical integration of Korean wholesalers and Korean American
retailers is not frictionless. Although outsiders cannot easily peer
into these relations, we can glean some insights from the public
record of litigation. The handful of cases implicating Korean
American wig and extensions retailers reveals that manufacturers
and wholesalers can be extremely demanding of retailers,
pressing them to agree to quotas of regular shipments, backed by
This appears to be the Indique model. See Our Company, supra note 188.
This appears to be the Mayvenn model. See Adams, supra note 176.
239 See BLACK HAIR, supra note 107.
240 Wilson & Martin, supra note 77.
237
238
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personal guarantees. 241 More generally, these cases show that
ethnic beauty supplies is a rough-and-tumble industry, where
business partners can turn on one another. 242 Co-ethnic bonds
must therefore not be presumed.
Of course, this may also be an industry where in-group
incumbents compete intensely against one another but are willing
to band together to stymie out-group insurgents. This is the model
from other markets such as finance. 243 Yet those markets are
typically dominated by a small oligopoly of large producers.
Here, we are dealing with a large and diverse world of small
retailers.
Nonetheless, if Korean American firms are analyzed as a
cohesive unit, then their staying power would push antitrust
toward finding an offense and devising a remedy—either for
express coordination or, more experimentally, parallel exclusion.
If competitors or consumers can produce evidence of express
coordination, then this market would show that collusive and
exclusionary scheme may be more stable than antitrust theory
holds. 244 This determination may depend on the intuition from
sociology that an ethnic group withdraws into itself,
strengthening co-ethnic bonds, when threatened by exogenous
forces. 245 Here the external threats would be competition and
interracial tensions. Alternatively, at the wholesale level, Korean
American firms may well be determining independently (rather
than working together) to deny out-group rivals access to a
necessary input. Even still, antitrust doctrine around
noncooperative oligopolies may regard this as a form of parallel
exclusion that militates toward intervention. 246
Daweoo Int’l (America) Corp. v. Chade Int’l, Inc., 1992 WL 175600.
See T3Micro, Inc. v. SGI Co., Ltd., 2010 WL 11597603.
243 See [prior work redacted for anonymity].
244 See, e.g., Selten, supra note 19; Levenstein & Suslow, , supra note 19; Dick, ,
supra note 19.
245 See Turner & Bonacich, supra note 21.
246 See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1237–
38 (2013).
241
242
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Ultimately, market power is an attempt to express the delta,
or difference, between the market at hand and a perfectly
competitive counterfactual. 247 This bears out in the various
mathematical expressions of market power. 248 With the advent of
China and India as suppliers of hair and wigs, as well as platforms
to connect retailers and even consumers with non-Korean
suppliers, that delta may be diminishing. More empirical work on
price and marginal cost must be done, of course, but this market
may be converging toward perfect competition more swiftly than
ever before.
D. Facilitating Practices
A finding of market power does not end the inquiry. African
American challengers would have to couch their claims in
conformity with antitrust doctrine, which presently does not offer
many viable avenues.
One possible claim is that the actions of Korean American
wholesalers and retailers, from the refusal to carry African
American-made products to the refusal to extend African
American retailers credit, amount to a group boycott of—or a
horizontal agreement to refuse to deal with—African American
competitors. At its inception, courts had subjected group boycotts

Crane, supra note 166, at 33 (“[M]arket power only makes sense as an
expression, in relative terms, of the distance between the market as it is and a
competitive counterfactual . . . Since antitrust policy aims to reduce the delta
between a plausible competitive counterfactual and the actual circumstances,
market power should be understood as that delta--the infirmity that antitrust
law could correct.”).
248 E.g., the Lerner index: L = (P – MC)/P, where P denotes price and MC
marginal cost. Here the delta is between price and marginal cost. In other
words, in a perfectly competitive world, price would equal marginal cost, so
the excess of price over marginal cost reveals a firm’s market power.
247
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to per se illegality, the highest level of scrutiny in antitrust. 249 Yet,
as elsewhere in antitrust, condemnation of these schemes has
softened in recent years, particularly where procompetitive
justifications lurk. 250 This swing has been so extreme that the
presumption on group boycotts is now validity under a rule of
reason approach, rather than illegality under a per se approach. 251
As a vertical strategy, refusal to deal in facilitation of
exclusion is accorded even greater deference. Refusal to deal is
often brought as an essential facilities claim against a defendant
who controls a necessary input (typically, an infrastructure with
network effects) into a market.252 Customarily, the defendant is a
monopolist, or at least an oligopoly whose market power is
indisputable. 253 Yet even if African American challengers were to
establish that Korean American retailers harbored market power,
essential facilities has been eviscerated as a theory of harm. 254 The
high-water mark of the duty to deal doctrine has long passed, 255
and today’s courts simply view a refusal to deal as the province
of businesses.
Procompetitive efficiencies also justify information sharing, a
strategy among competitors that can be challenged as a
249 See, e.g., Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. U.S., 234 U.S. 600,
614 (1914); American Medical Ass’n v. U.S., 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Klors v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
250 See, e.g., NYMEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 134 (1998). For analysis
on this doctrine’s application to an ethnically segmented market similar to the
one at hand, see Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms:
Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325, 340–46
(2009).
251 HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 239.
252 See supra note 236.
253 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382 (1973);
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415
(2004).
254 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410–11 (“We have never recognized [the essential
facilities doctrine], and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it
here.”) (citations omitted).
255 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
611 (1985); Otter Tail, 410 U.S.
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facilitation device for collusion and exclusion even in the absence
of express agreement. Claimants might allege, for example, that
the publication of product catalogs and trade journals in the
Korean language operates to signal inventory pricing while
shutting out non-Korean retailers. In their defense, the
incumbents might point to the dominance of South Korean
manufacturers and exporters as suppliers, with whom U.S.
distributers and retailers can communicate more easily in Korean.
The likelihood of success of these claims is difficult to quantify.
On one hand, the wigs and extensions market is characterized by
fungible products and inelastic demand, 256 and these information
exchanges might pertain to price 257 or further a group boycott.258
On the other hand, however, information exchanges are more
suspect in concentrated markets,259 and African American
insurgents must be able to point to some sort of actual exchange
of information, ideally within the incriminating areas. 260 This
claim seems to turn, again, on market power, which itself turns on
the appropriateness of analysis at the firm versus ethnic group
level.
Efficiencies do abound in the wig and extensions market. The
degree of vertical integration among co-ethnic manufacturers,
distributors, and retailers means that products can be moved
quickly to any locality in the U.S. Korean American retailers in
African American communities can also spot new trends and
transmit this information to South Korean manufacturers, who
can respond rapidly. Simultaneously, the rough-and-tumble

256 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 236 (information exchange certain to be
condemned if the market is concentrated, the price is fungible, and demand is
inelastic).
257 See id. at 237 (price information exchanges suspicious). See also American
Column & Lumber Co. v. U.S., 257 U.S. 377 (1921); U.S. v. American Linseed
Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
258 See Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914).
259 See supra note 256.
260 For a similar discussion, see Richman, supra note 250, at 352–55.
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competition among retailers means that prices should converge
toward competitive, rather than supracompetitive, levels.
The central question this ESM market is therefore who is
harmed: Who is harmed by the actions of Korean American firms
in this market—African American consumers or competitors? If
prices are competitive, the answer would not be consumers.
Indeed, group boycotts, refusals to deal, and information
exchanges are injurious only to competitors, with offsetting
efficiencies for consumers. The very use of “ethnic misalignment”
for this market suggests that it is competitors who are harmed
because they are denied the chance to sell to co-ethnic
consumers. 261
To work through the implications, we might imagine a
market in which an African American insurgent were to break
through and eventually run away with market share—say, if
Mayvenn or Indique were to displace the vast majority of Korean
American retailers. In such a market, with a monopoly firmly in
control, prices would trend toward supracompetitive levels.
Which, then, would African American consumers prefer? The
ethnically misaligned market where thousands of out-group
producers compete against one another but shut out in-group
competitors, or the ethnically aligned market dominated by one
producer with clear market power?
The answer is unclear. While pertinent to the wig and
extensions market, this question also underscores the
ambivalence of the consumer welfare standard in antitrust; for
this market is characterized by intense intra-producer
competition, yet consumers are unsatisfied by their choices.
As for the more basic questions of whether Korean American
firms bear market power and whether antitrust would condemn
their business practices, the results are indeterminate. In the face
of such indeterminacy, it would seem unwise to concoct new
theories on market power or facilitating practices. However,
inaction means that antitrust doctrine will have come down in
261

Thanks to Harry First for pointing this out.
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favor of one ethnic group. Such is the quandary at the heart of an
ESM market where both producers and consumers are peoples of
color. Err for producers, and antitrust will have endorsed a
community of mostly immigrant entrepreneurs who have opted
out of the mainstream U.S. economy because of racial barriers. Err
for consumers, and antitrust will have upheld a racial group that
has been denied participation in the sale of a product that is
central to their identity.
V. CONCLUSION
The stakes are high for getting ESM markets right. In the U.S.,
interactions between peoples of color often unfold as commercial
transactions in markets where groups are pushed into close
quarters, hemmed in on all sides by structural racism and
systemic exclusion. When, as in the wig and extensions market,
those markets are ethnically misaligned, intergroup tensions can
be inflamed. Such tensions exploded in 1992 with racial unrest in
Los Angeles, but it was not an anomaly. Korean American-owned
wig stores have been destroyed during protests in Ferguson,
Missouri, in 2014 after prosecutors failed to Michael Brown’s
killer and also in Baltimore in 2015 after the funeral of Freddie
Gray. 262
As the very first step, a proper understanding of ESM markets
is critical. This Article has synthesized the disparate literature on
ethnically segmented markets to create the theoretical foundation
for ESM markets. In using the wig and extensions market as an
illustration, the Article reveals how ESM markets challenge
traditional notions of market power and oligopoly stability.
Hence, ESM markets and antitrust doctrine are mutually
illuminating.
More empirical work must be completed before we can
determine whether antitrust law conveys any recourse to African
American retailers and consumers in the wig and extensions
262

Petrulis, supra note 15, at 30.

9/9/2020 5:04 PM

DRAFT

2020]

ETHNICALLY SEGMENTED MARKETS

59

market. However, for the first time in decades, this market is
changing quickly from new sourcing strategies that have
bolstered the hand of African American competitors. The old
guard of Korean American retailers is also aging out, and their
children may eschew this hardscrabble business, with its intense
competition, diminishing margins, and interracial tensions. Given
the dynamic process of racial and ethnic formation, these children
may not even feel the same fidelity toward co-ethnic bonds. Thus,
by the time antitrust has devised a solution, this market may have
outgrown the need for redress.

